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Constitutional Othering, Ambiguity and Subjective Risks of Mobilization in
Hungary: Examples from the Migration Crisis
Abstract
This article discusses how an illiberal regime within the EU can hinder the mobilization of citizens
and civil actors by creating an atmosphere of “ambiguity”. In our analysis, we first discuss the Con-
stitution of 2011, which provides the driving force of the regime, and next using the example of the
migration crisis show how this atmosphere of ambiguity is created. We argue that although there is
no physical violence present, opponents of the regime are disheartened to act because of the general
atmosphere relying on the logic of constitutional othering, dividing the world into its enemies and
friends and shifting from the rule of law to ruling by law. While the regime’s gaudy campaigns
against immigrants, NGOs, Central European University, the EU or George Soros are omnipresent,
we aim to go deeper and highlight the mechanism through which the regime manages to discourage
citizens from voicing their discontent.
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Introduction
Hungary after 1989 was long considered the forerunner of successful democratization. After 2011,
with the adoption of the Fundamental Law (2011) it is again a forerunner, this time of de-democratiz-
ation and illiberalism within one of the member states of the EU. In this article, we explain the mech-
anisms through which Hungary’s illiberal regime constrains citizens’ mobilization in an EU member
state where inclusive constitutional values (e.g. protection of human rights, equality and human dig-
nity), i.e. core values of the European Union, are increasingly eroded1. This erosion, however, took
place in a way that institutions remained in place, and there are elections, which may create the im-
pression that Hungary still conforms to basic norms proclaimed by the EU.
One of the fundamental questions for mobilization studies is how state authorities de-
mobilize activists2, and what holds people back from participating in protests3. In a seminal
study Boykoff has developed an immensely useful taxonomy of the subtler ways through which
authorities can repress dissent4. One of the mechanism he identifies is intimidation, the mechan-
ism we argue plays a crucial role in the way Hungary’s illiberal regime governs via – what we
call – ambiguity and othering to intimidate citizens and deter their activism.5
The  fact,  that  Hungary’s  example  is  spreading  to  other  Central-Eastern  European
(CEE) countries suggests that although we offer a single case study – using the migration crisis
as the background story – it talks to a general audience being puzzled about processes of “de-
democratization” we are witnessing in Europe. The Polish turn of events6 shows that the Hun-
garian way might become a recipe to follow for other CEE Member States and perhaps for oth-
er Member States, too7.
Writing about Hungary, we do not discuss failures of the EU’s refugee policy and legislation
– failures we are aware of. However, we highlight that the Hungarian constitutional system diverges
from the inclusive nature of the EU’s legal system, and although populist-exclusivist elements of
political rhetoric are also present elsewhere in Europe, they have not become part of constitutional
law and have not transformed the political system, that is, other EU Member States did not com-
pletely redefine the “rules of the game” by adopting a new constitution or modifying all im-
portant laws to favour the regime8. This is crucial, because the Fundamental Law (the Hungarian
Constitution of 2011) is not only a frame, but it is the driving force and the normative basis of the
functioning of the illiberal system. Not only does the Fundamental Law outline abstract moral prin-
ciples, but these moral principles are actually manifest in the political system, in the actions of politi-
cians, bureaucrats and citizens, which the regime comprehensively refers to as the System of Nation-
al Cooperation (NER). What makes the Hungarian case unique in the EU is that in Hungary political
propaganda and legislative measures cannot be separated9 . 
After introducing the Fundamental Law and the principles upon which the regime is built  -
dividing the world into friends and enemies, centralizing power and disrespecting autonomous insti-
tutions and divergent voices (Majtényi 2015a) - we will explain how the regime hinders citizens’ mo-
bilization by creating conditions under which it is difficult to foresee and evaluate risks of participa-
tion in political protests or in any act that challenges the regime. We argue that creating ambiguities
concerning the implications of one’s actions is part and parcel of the illiberal regime’s operation; in
fact, it is partly by such ambiguities that citizens are kept passive as it raises the risks associate with
protest activities. In the second part of the paper, we use the refugee crisis to illustrate this situation
with concrete examples. However, it is important to underline the status of our case: the aim of using
the of the migration crisis as an example is to highlight how the illiberal regime governs and how the
Fundamental Law translates into governmental practice, rather than to offer a detailed account of the
various stages of the migration crisis, with the government introducing one campaign after the other,
leading to the Stop Soros campaign beginning in the Winter of 2017.10 Also, it is important to under-
line that focusing on the migration crisis we do not ask why citizens did not protest at that time (as
we actually argue they did by helping refugees), but try to capture the governmental technologies
that the illiberal regime relies on to hinder and discourages mobilization. 
The flow of refugees reaching Hungary in the summer of 2015 called for mobilization based
on solidarity and the dignity of all human beings. Yet, as we will also point out, civil actors’ gestures
of solidarity increasingly developed into symbols of resistance against the illiberal regime. This fol-
lowed logically  from the government’s  policy that  showed no concern  for,  but  actually  flouted,
asylum-seekers’ human rights, similarly to the way they disregard the rights of certain Hungarian cit-
izens (e.g. those of the Roma minority). As a result, acts in support of asylum seekers created a type
of sociality in symbolic terms – built on solidarity and bottom-up self-organization – that was anti -
thetical to the logic of the Hungarian Fundamental Law. 
The  key  concept  we  rely  on  in  our  analysis  is  the  perceived  –  or  subjective  risk  –  of
participation. Today citizens in Western democracies do not think they are in any danger if they
express  discontent  with  their  politicians.  This  normalization  of  protest  activity,  however,  has
prompted the question why even in established democracies people are still frequently reluctant to
act in order to voice their grievances. Researchers focusing on this issue have started to study the
costs of participation (including costs for the individuals involved: being present, sacrificing one’s
free time,  travelling to  the spot  of  the protest;  and costs  for  organizers:  maintaining a  network,
reaching possible  participants,  etc.).  While  this  approach is  suitable  for  the study of  established
democracies, we have problems adapting it for analyzing Hungary, as our survey has found that one
of the major constraints for Hungarian citizens’ participation is the fear of repercussions11. Hence, we
believe that the issue of risks must be integrated into the study of mobilization in Hungary, similarly
to studies of civil society’s activities in Russia12.
McAdam clearly pointed out as early as in the 80s that it is very important to distinguish
between the costs and risks of participation, with the latter being associated with perceived danger13.
"While the act of signing a petition is always low cost, the risk of doing so may, in certain contexts
— during the height of McCarthy-ism, for example —- be quite high."14. When writing about risks
the literature predominantly refers to  physical  repression,  which is  not surprising when scholars
study demonstrations in a non-democratic context. To give an example, Opp15 (1994) analyzed mass
demonstrations against the communist regime in East Germany in 1989, while in their recent study
Ayanian  and Tausch16 write  about  activists  in  Egypt  in  2013.  In  the  case  of  such  authoritarian
regimes, such violent reaction from the authorities as police attacks are hardly surprising. Davenport
defines state repression as the "...actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual
or organization, [...] for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific
activities..." 17meaning, for example, political surveillance, illegal detention or torture18.
In  Hungary,  however,  authorities  are  unlikely  to  take  such  actions,  as  the  Hungarian
government prefers "soft" techniques of state repression. In our 2014 survey noted above, we tested
Hungarians’ perceptions about  the general risk of participation in demonstrations and found that
more than one third (35.6%) of our respondents had serious fears of retribution in their workplace,
and more than one fifth (21.1%) had serious fears of friends' condemnation if they were to participate
in a demonstration..19 This means that Hungarians are highly prone to regard protest as fraught with
risks. The aim of our study is to elucidate how the regime creates this high level of subjective risk of
political participation among Hungarian citizens by othering and by an atmosphere of ambiguity.
Doing  so,  we  must  emphasize  that  the  objective  and  subjective  dimensions  of  risk  should  be
analytically and empirically distinguished20 because the question is not whether a regime actually
penalizes resistance, but if citizens believe that it could do so at its will, a question intimately linked
up with trust in the rule of law.
The subjective dimension of risk is  defined as the personal evaluation/expectation of the
future cost of an activity – for example, the individual’s expectation about the likelihood that the
police would attack demonstrators during the protest. Contrary to this, the objective dimension of
risk refers to such well-defined consequences as penalties stipulated by law for the illegal pasting of
posters21. The point we make is that this differentiation may hold in a state where the  rule of law
applies, but the differentiation is much more difficult if the state  rules by law, i.e. the government
rewrites laws according to its daily political needs (occasionally in ways that violate human rights).
In the latter case, citizens never have objective knowledge of the consequences their actions would
entail, which we contend is the situation in Hungary. Thus, the issue we highlight is that risks are
frequently  tainted  by  ambiguity,  and  it  is  the  ambiguity  the  regime  creates  about  the  actual
consequences  of  one’s  actions  that  may  become  a  powerful  tool  of  soft  repression  hindering
mobilization. Our point is therefore that it is impossible to understand mobilization and its meaning
either for the polity in general or for participants without scrutinizing the context of ambiguity and
the perceived risks it creates for citizens’ participation.
Constitutional atmosphere and the context it creates for mobilization
In 2010, the FIDESZ-KDNP22 coalition won the general election with an over two thirds majority
and in 2011, the governing FIDESZ-KDNP party alliance adopted a new constitution called the Fun-
damental Law, which entered into force on 1 January 2012, superseding the previous constitution
(Constitution of 1989).
The Fundamental Law was the first constitution adopted in a member state after the Lisbon
Treaty, thus it was probably partly a reaction to the attempted EU constitution’s emphasis on an in-
clusive value system; the failures of former Hungarian governments (1990 to 2010) to implement ef-
fective social and inclusion policies and the subsequent general de-legitimization of social-liberal
leadership and the decade long austerity measures23. The Fundamental Law dropped the unachieved
egalitarian aims of the former constitutional system and shifted towards an anti-egalitarian and ethnic
concept of the nation as a source of power.24
Its preamble (the National Avowal) provides a set of values, such as fidelity, belonging to the
Hungarian ethnic nation and to the Christian Church, whereby it divides the political community and
offers a one-sided value preference infringing the interests of those who do not belong to Christianity
or to the ethnic nation, or refuse to vow fidelity to the will of the majority. In fact, it could be argued
that the Fundamental Law is permeated by a Schmittean logic25because it divides the people into us
and  them (meaning the differentiation both between worthy and unworthy members of the com-
munity, and between friends and enemies). For the latter, it creates an unequal status, which makes
the Fundamental Law diverge in many ways from the constitutional standards of liberal democra-
cies26 by tilting towards values the purported majority allegedly subscribes to. Contrasting the Funda-
mental Law with Jacobean ideals shows strong similarities in thinking, with the latter suggesting that
“the state represents the people’s will, and the existence of plural institutions and social forces only
fragments that will.”27 In the Hungarian Constitutional regulation, this “general will” – or people’s
will – appears as the ethnic nation’s will, creating the basis for Hungary’s legal order to be rooted in
the “will of the nation”, with the nation being rooted in shared ethnicity28.
One of the main problems with this construction – beyond its references to the ethnic nation
as a source of power – is that it tends to mix up the nation’s will with that of the government, imply -
ing that anyone in minority cannot be right by definition and presumably is an enemy who turns
against the will of the nation. This opens the way for right-wing populist politics that nobody and
nothing – not even an independent state or civil institutions – should stand in the way of the govern-
ment, and the government is justified to rely on illiberal forms of governance and to turn against
these agents in the name of the national interest.29 This utmost confidence of being in possession of
the “one truth” coupled with the ethnic nation’s will translates into intolerance of difference and cre-
ates a lack of solidarity with those whose life style is different from the standards of the majority. By
defining a preferred way of life for citizens, the Fundamental Law narrows down their choices and
guides them towards the moral conviction and way of life the legislator deems worthy.30  This has the
corollary that the Fundamental Law also defines those of lesser value for not sharing the purported
values and norms of the majority. The exclusive value preference of the Fundamental Law, combined
with the emphasis on rights being tied to obligations and responsibilities, creates an especially unfa-
vourable situation for minorities because they may be frequently unfit, hindered or, because of their
convictions, unwilling to meet these responsibilities and obligations.
For instance, as part of the right to work, Article XII of the Fundamental Law stipulates the
obligation to work according to one’s abilities and possibilities. Article XIX of the Constitution lim-
its the rights of the unemployed by granting entitlements for social aid only if the jobless person ex-
periences “unemployment for reasons outside of his or her control.” Furthermore, Paragraph 3 of the
same Article states that “[T]he nature and extent of social measures may be determined in an Act in
accordance with the usefulness to the community of the beneficiary’s activity.” “Usefulness to the
community” in these provisions is telling if we remember that many of the unemployed are of the
Roma community – the largest minority in Hungary – living not only under unfavourable social con-
ditions, but also being the subject of widespread prejudices. Under these conditions, as terms such as
“useful for the community” and an event “outside of one’s control” are to be decided by the majority,
potentially reinforcing rather than countering prejudices, and offering justifications for turning preju-
dices into actual policies31.
Another characteristic of the exclusive value preference of the Constitution is putting the ma-
jority’s “cultural values” above the protection of human rights, that also shows how the will of “the
nation” overwrites liberal individualism A pertinent example is the way the legislator punishes home-
lessness32. According to the Fundamental Law, the rights of homeless people may be restricted by
law in order to protect “public order, public security, public health and cultural values.” As Udvarhe-
lyi points out, Hungary is probably “the only country in the world where the possibility of penalizing
homelessness is encoded in the constitution itself.”33  Restricting fundamental rights in order to pro-
tect “cultural values” is in itself problematic because it violates human dignity, which stands at the
pinnacle of human rights protection. Furthermore, this example of constitutional othering offers a
clear indication of the kind of political community the Fundamental Law and its creators envision.34
This spirit of the Constitution is also reflected in the lawmakers’ general attitude to the legal
system. That is, the government does not respect the rule of law35, meaning that it adopts and amends
law according to its daily political needs36, the needs of “the majority”, “the ethnic nation”. While on
the level of ideology this suggests that whatever the government does is identical with the “will of
the nation”, on the level of practical politics it turns the legal system into an instrument of the ruling
government’s daily political machinations and the machinery of arbitrary decisions taken by those in
power.37 This implies that it is frequently unclear how far the government would go in pursuing its
goals and when, if needed, it would turn against its opponents, which as we will explain in detail,
creates a powerful obstacle to public protest. To make matters worse, although the government has
made efforts to formally maintain the democratic system, in substance it has hollowed it out to min-
imize opportunities for voicing dissent or disagreement. A pertinent example is that despite its major-
ity in Parliament, the government tries to avoid all forms of debate on future laws. In practical terms,
the government no longer draws up and submits bills to Parliament applying the normal procedure,
as in that case the government would be obliged by law to initiate social consultation, inviting inter-
ested civil society groups and opposition parties to the preparation of the draft. Instead, it relies on
individual MPs to propose bills, because in this case consultations do not need to take place 38. This
“tricky way” of circumventing public consultations is especially absurd in the case of cardinal acts
and constitutional amendments, which have frequently been submitted in such a manner. 
During the refugee the refugee crisis the government also radically transformed the asylum
law, going against the principles of the rule of law, namely against legal certainty and international
and  European  human  rights  and  refugee  law standards.  At  the  time  of  the  refugee  crisis,  only
between  July  and  September  2015,  it  amended  19  acts  and  19  government  regulations  at  473
points39 , with  the judicial review of asylum procedures reduced to a mere formality. Furthermore,
these legislative changes have opened possibilities of arbitrary decisions against citizens (as well),
for instance, when the new legislation authorized the police to enter private homes without a war-
rant “to ensure the implementation of measures against epidemics”40.The police were also entitled by
“the crisis situation caused by mass immigration" to enter the refugees’ suspected shelter without
warrant.41
What does this all add up to? We argue that this spirit of the Fundamental Law – and sub-
sequent legislations like the asylum law, – turn politics into a constant search for those who do not fit
the national standards, those who try to undermine it, who are presented as opponents, perhaps even
as enemies of the nation. Furthermore, by its creative use of legal procedures it conveys the message
that the government could freely exploit any situation to its liking, regarding the law as something
the legislator could use instrumentally, creating an ambiguous situation concerning one’s actions as
the rules could be changes at the governments liking on a whim. We believe this is crucial, because
only through understanding this general context can we understand the subtle way the government
hinders mobilization and the reasons for citizens’ fear of repercussions if they act against the regime. 
Risk and ambiguity of mobilization during the migration crisis
In this section, we are not offering a detailed account of the migration crisis in Hungary. We simply
aim to show how the constitutional atmosphere (constitutional othering and rule by law) discussed
above helps us to contextualize mobilization during the migration crisis and allows us to highlight
the significance that an atmosphere of ambiguity may have for the mobilization of civil actors, NGOs
and citizens concerned.
Before discussing the example of the migration crisis, it is important to highlight that in Hun-
gary in no way did the “migration crisis” depend on the number of refugees or on its rapid increase:
firstly, because the government’s anti-immigration campaign predated flows of refugees; secondly
because even when refugees came in large numbers, their majority never planned to stay in Hungary;
and thirdly because for quite some time newly arrived people were allowed to trespass the country
more or less freely. Thus, already before the number of asylum seekers suddenly increased in the
summer of 2015, the Hungarian government had begun to politicize migration and started to promote
a “clash of civilizations” narrative identifying “migrants”/refugees first as threats to Hungary’s cul-
ture and a danger to Hungarian workers whose jobs they were supposedly taking, and later as poten-
tial terrorists threatening Europe42. While foremost this was a tool for the government to buttress its
power by finding a new enemy to fight, it is reasonable to argue that it also carried the message to its
potential opponents that the government could find further “enemy others” at will and thereby any-
body could be turned into the “next enemy”43.
This way of framing immigrants fitted the government’s habit of finding ever-newer enemies,
including even the EU. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán proclaimed already in 2012 that “Hungary will
not be a colony!”, accusing the EU of imperialism and comparing the EU to the Soviet Union,44
while also attacking civil society’s organizations, many of which are supported by George Soros. The
reasoning was:
These organizations are kept for millions of dollars, what these organizations do –
all they have to do – in exchange for American money, is to attack the Hungarian
government, attack Fidesz, and attack the Prime Minister of Hungary on all possible
forums.45 
It is important to note that this quote comes from 2013, long before the attack on Central
European University  (CEU)46 or  the  anti-George  Soros  posters  covering  the  streets  of  Hungary.
Among the first enemies the government picked were the left, the IMF (already in 2011-2012), the
Norwegian NGO Fund and civil organizations (in 2014),47 and it was only in 2015 that the govern-
ment’s attention turned to refugees, although at that time their numbers were still relatively small.
In  the  spring  of  2015,  the  government  littered  the  country  with  anti-refugee  billboards,48
making it evident that the migrants would be the new enemies identified by the government.49 By the
summer  of  2015,  the  number  of  refugees  had  increased  significantly  with  refugees  coming
predominantly from Syria and Afghanistan, leading to thousands gathering in Budapest’s main train
station50. As the Hungarian government left no doubt that it recognized no responsibilities for them, it
was for civil society to show solidarity. New grassroots civil society organizations emerged to help
refugees and fulfil duties that should have been performed by the state51. New Facebook groups were
created52 to coordinate cooking, the distribution of various supplies and to meet the refugees’ needs,
including handing out information leaflets. While at the beginning, help concentrated on cities, later
as refugees were stopped at the border, supporters (naturally fewer in number) also moved to the
borders where their help was needed. For example, they were very active at Röszke, where refugees
were made to stay in a cornfield without any infrastructure53, and it was on the insistence of civil
activists  and  medical  experts  that  local  authorities  understood  that  something  had  to  be  done,
otherwise people sleeping rough would die in the cold September nights of 2015.54
Without going into more detail – as other authors have offered thorough accounts of these
events55 –  what  is  crucial  is  that  the  environment  surrounding  activists  was permeated  by  legal
ambiguity. For  example,  the  founders  of  Facebook  groups  sometimes  collected  money  on  their
personal  bank  account,  which  was  illegal  according  to  Hungarian  tax  rules.  Volunteers  were
preparing hot meals and handing them out at train stations, which would normally require licenses.
Others invited refugees to stay in their homes, lent them their mobile phones or drove them in their
cars. While the former ones were minor issues, the latter two ways of help were of great significance
as they may be categorized as smuggling, therefore are crimes punishable with up to several years in
prison. Yet, it was hard to decide what would be deemed illegal. On certain occasions, it was the state
itself that moved refugees across Hungary56; so strictly speaking the state was participating in human
smuggling. Consequently, for example the activist Szilárd Kalmár justified his actions by saying,
“Yes, I admit I am smuggling people, but so does Viktor Orbán by bussing 6000 refugees to Austria
without papers and registration.”57 One civil organization activist told us that when they asked the
police to help them get a sick refugee-baby to hospital, the police were ready to do so, nevertheless
they were told to be careful not to be stopped by other police cars because they might be accused of
smuggling.58 The ambiguity of the situation was further aggravated, for example, by the Head of the
Catholic Church claiming that: “The Church would become a smuggler if it accepted refugees.”59
Also, investigating citizens’ attitudes towards refugees in a small village near the border, sociologist
Feischmidt was told that when the school teacher of the village drove two refugee women with small
kids in her car, she was stopped by the police and charged with smuggling60.
Thus, the fear was not unfounded, although whether the government would actually charge
someone with smuggling – and when – was something no one knew with any certainty.  As the
government was increasingly harsher in its anti-immigrant rhetoric, more radical steps against civil
actors could not be excluded. In fact, they had reason to expect governmental attacks against them to
intensify – and subjectively to assess risks of protests activities to have increased – which also had
the corollary that many who were otherwise willing to help refugees were reluctant to, because they
did not intend to mingle with civil actors (as we will explain).
What gives further reason to thinking that, indeed, this scenario of charging activists with
smuggling could not be excluded is that after the crisis, the German tabloid Bild published an article
claiming that Viktor Orbán had been threatening Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann that unless
Austrian citizens stopped bussing refugees to Austria, he would charge them with smuggling.61 Thus,
if the government was ready to charge Austrians with smuggling, it would certainly not have had
reservations about doing the same to Hungarians.
What is important is that although charges of smuggling were hardly ever raised, given the
general  atmosphere,  the  subjective  risk  that  citizens  sensed  was  high,  as  they  were  never  sure
whether the government would decide to take this step. As we argued earlier in the section discussing
the Fundamental Law and the government’s instrumental use of law making, one could reasonably
assume that nothing would stop the government from these accusations if it deemed they fitted its
political  interest.  That  is,  in  a  situation where the authorities interpret  laws freely and seek one
enemy after the other, ordinary people are prone to evaluate the subjective costs and risks of their
participation as extremely high. This is partly because of the ambiguities (i.e. they do not see the law
as  protecting  them  against  arbitrary  decisions),  partly  because  the  law  is  always  rewritten  at
governmental will, and also because they might always think that they would be the next “other” that
the government would turn against. We contend that these subjective expectations deriving from an
ambiguous atmosphere lead to less intense participation or passivity. 
Furthermore, it is important to underline, that due to the constitutional othering the subjective
fear  of  consequences  hindered  the  participation  of  political  activists  as  well  as  of  citizens  also
because it was not necessarily the actors themselves who defined their actions as political. That is
acts of resistance to the regime became difficult to separate from acts of solidarity with the refugees
and their hungry children crying at the train station. Asking people revealed that many participated
merely  to  show their  solidarity62.  This  became  clear  especially  after  the  first  few weeks  when
activists finally had time to rest and discuss questions of institutionalization and further objectives.
Disagreement  between  members  came  to  the  fore,  as  many  were  not  regarding  themselves  as
participants  in  a  protest  movement,63 or  had  no  political  objective.64 Nevertheless,  it  was  not
necessarily the actors themselves who identified the meaning of their actions. Due to the general
political  environment,  even  if  they  had no political  motivation,  others  would  often  read  certain
motives into their acts. Why? Because in a system that was showing no (or very limited) solidarity
with  the  homeless,  the  handicapped or  the  Roma,  what  could  have  been more  outrageous  than
solidarity  with  foreign  refugees?  Thus,  the  crisis  carried  an  enormous  symbolic  significance  by
touching upon the core constitutive notions the regime has built its rule and its vision of Hungary on,
where from the perspective of the System of National Cooperation,  activists  supported the most
unlikely group of “others”, i.e. refugees of a different creed.  This is crucial, because it explains
why participation in acts of solidarity also were seen threatening by many not merely because
of  the  state’s  repression,  but  also  because  of  stigmatization.  By  its  policy  of  othering  the
government had deepened cleavages in Hungarian society, thus activists had to face not only
possible state repression, but – perhaps more important – the condemnation of their friends. In
the interviews conducted by Tóth and Kertész activists  tell  about their experience of being
deleted by their friends on Facebook,65 being in line with our finding in our survey of 2014 that
activism is partly hindered by the fear of disapproval of one’s friends.
Furthermore, by pointing this out we can explain why at certain occasions, for example
in 2014, citizens actively protested the government’s plan to introduce an internet tax. Whereas
the  issue  of  migration  divided  society,  the  introduction  of  the  internet-tax  did  not,  thus
participants could hardly fear to be condemned and regarded un-patriotic,  contrary to the
migration crisis that was securitized and was framed as an existential issue by the government
threatening the community66.
Under such conditions simply handing out sandwiches to hungry refugee children could be
interpreted as a political act against the regime. Why is it important whether an action has political or
non-political,  altruistic motivations? Because if  an action is interpreted as political,  it  involves a
different set of costs and risks than if it was interpreted as altruistic. In an ambiguous legal situation,
where the political system is based on an exclusive logic, a political action may call high subjective
probabilities of sanctions and retributions. As attacks against civil society had been going on at least
since 2013, it was reasonable to worry about being associated with civil society, which was likely to
become the regime’s next enemy “other” to turn against.  
It  is  difficult  to tell  whether creating this  atmosphere of ambiguity has been a conscious
governmental strategy. Was smuggling insinuated only to discourage participation, or was it actually
meant as a serious threat? In either case, this atmosphere has had a negative impact on citizens’
willingness to participate, resulting in reluctance not only to take part in political protests, but also in
any civil activity, as people never know if their acts would ultimately be interpreted as taking a
political stance. 67
In 2017 and 2018, we are witnessing a further escalation of the politicization of the issue of
migration.  Orbán and other prominent government officials  keep repeating the claim, phrased in
militaristic  terms,  that  connects  terrorism,  migrants  and  asylum seekers,  NGOs,  and  CEU with
national self-defence. As Bernáth and Messing point out, mentioning terrorism in a connection with
different  groups  of  the  society,  is  criminalizing  the  members  of  these  groups  and  it  is  clearly
alienating.68. The governmental propaganda speaks about a “Soros network” that seeks to undermine
the cultural integrity of Hungary through supporting asylum seekers by linking “economic migrants”
to the threat of terrorism. The quote below is a perfect example of the way the government weaves
NGOs,  George  Soros  and the  migrant  issue into  a  sort  of  conspiracy  against  the  nation.  Prime
Minister Viktor Orbán said in one of his speeches in February 2017: 
We  are  not  talking  about  non-governmental  organizations  fighting  to  promote  an
important cause, but about paid activists from international organizations and their
branch offices in Hungary. […] This is the transnational empire of George Soros, with
its  international heavy artillery and huge sums of  money.  […] the organizations of
George Soros are working tirelessly to bring hundreds of thousands of migrants into
Europe.69
As stated earlier, in the Hungarian illiberal system, political propaganda and legislative measures
cannot be separated. If the illiberal character of the government should be defended, it might seem
natural in the spirit of the constitution to fight critical “disloyal” forces internally (most importantly
NGOs and academic institutions, such as CEU). The 2017 amendments to the law on “national”
higher education targeting Central European University (and keeping CEU in uncertainty whether it
can  stay  in  Hungary  at  the  time  of  writing  this  article)70,  laws  against  NGOs71 or  the  Seventh
Amendment72 of the Fundamental Law fit the logic of searching for enemies threatening the ethnic
nation. They are just the next steps in the propaganda that started during the migration campaign,
even though the rhetoric and the legislation has become more threatening. 
We increasingly see in daily events that, if it deems necessary, the government turns against
critics of its policies. Thus, the subjective risks citizens feel are hardly unfounded. We can mention,
for example, the case of the “Liget Protector” civil disobedience movement arbitrarily fined for
their activities73;  or a participant voicing his grievances at a demonstration (in 2016 in the city of
Pécs) being fired from his workplace where he worked as a cook in a primary school;74 or the police
has seizing the computers of students demonstrating in 2018 against the poor performance of the
education system.75 We do not know how authorities pick their victims, and it is possible that perhaps
the cook was dismissed for a different reason. Yet, what is crucial is that these stories appear in the
papers, and in the system defined by the Fundamental Law and instrumental law-making, readers
find  their  fears  confirmed.  As  a  result,  they  think  twice  before  they  challenge  the  regime  or
participate in protests.
Conclusion
In  our  article  we  have  scrutinized  the  way  Hungary’s  illiberal  regime  discourages  citizens  to
mobilize.  Our starting point  was a  survey we conducted in 2014. This survey revealed that one
reason for Hungarian citizens’ reluctance to mobilize was their fear of negative consequences. Our
aim was to offer an explanation of why citizens associate a high level of subjective risks with protest
activities although so far the regime has not relied on violent forms of repression.
We have argued that in order to explain why citizens are deterred from mobilization, first it is
necessary  to  understand  the  nature  of  Hungary’s  political  regime,  because  opportunities  for
mobilization are dependent on the general legal and political environment. In the case of Hungary,
we  have  suggested  that  the  best  approach  for  capturing  this  is  by  scrutinizing  the  way  the
Fundamental Law envisions politics, the political community and the citizens’ role within. Thus, we
have analysed the Fundamental Law, showing the manner in which it emphasizes the primacy of the
ethnic nation that forms the “will” of the nation, ignoring minority opinions or opinions violating the
majority’s  purported  standards,  thereby  creating  the  conditions  where  “othering”  and  picking
enemies of the nation are the standard way to operate the regime. This general “will” of the ethnic
nation  is  supposed to  be realized  within  the  System of  National  Cooperation  with  all  acting  in
harmony in a centralized manner, where civil society is to become an integral part of the structure,
meaning that only those civil actors – and citizens’ initiatives – are regarded legitimate that conform
to the guidance of the government – with others identified as its enemies.
Furthermore, we have highlighted that although the regime does not rely on violent means of
oppression, by its instrumental twisting and application of the law – which we captured by saying
that instead of realizing  the rule of the law the government actually rules by laws – governmental
practices create an atmosphere of ambiguity where opponents are unaware of the dangers they face if
they choose to act against the regime. They might be unpunished, but might be – e.g. in the case of
the refugee crisis – accused of smuggling, which could be punished by several years’ imprisonment.
The two points we have argued are (1) the regime’s continuous identification of enemies to
fight against (meaning othering) and (2) the ambiguity it maintains concerning the implications of
people’s actions and possible retributions, by which the regime hinders citizens’ mobilization. As a
result of this ambiguity, citizens associate any protest activity with a high level of subjective risk. 
At this point, we explained that under these conditions, citizens and civil groups offer of help
to refugees could easily be seen as political acts against the regime (and volunteers helping refugees
could be easily portrayed as opponents of the regime – even if they had no such intention) rather than
as  acts  of  solidarity.  From  the  perspective  of  the  System  of  National  Cooperation,  by  helping
refugees of a different religion, civil activists supported the most unlikely group of people. For a
system that was showing no (or very limited) solidarity with its own minorities (e.g. the homeless,
the handicapped, or the Roma),  nothing could be more outrageous than solidarity with refugees.
Thus,  the  refugee  crisis  carried  an  enormous  symbolic  significance  by  touching  upon  the  core
constitutive  notions  upon  which  the  regime  has  built  its  rule  and  its  vision  of  Hungary,  as
symbolically embodied in the Fundamental Law. It is by understanding this that we can grasp why
the refugee crisis and campaigns against George Soros – purportedly planning to settle millions of
immigrants to Hungary according to the Hungarian government propaganda – became crucial for the
regime years after the refugee crisis to keep the campaign alive and to maintain the propaganda of
being under attack, even though refugees were hardly arriving in Hungary. 
Although in our paper we focus on Hungary, we believe our study is of general significance
by highlighting how a regime may rely on soft oppression to discourage discontented citizens to raise
their  voice  and  to  act  against  the  regime.  Although  by  highlighting  constitutional  othering,
governance by ambiguity and subjective risks of mobilization we cannot get to a full diagnosis of the
regime, these are important features to understand how Hungary’ constitutional system works and
why it  is  reasonable to argue that the country has deviated from the EU’s inclusive constitutive
values.   
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